Spreading education savings accounts and spreading innovation

New data from Arizona's Universal Education Savings Account program has been released, and Hot Take Mountain is already erupting.

In a short paper published by the Brookings Institution with the not-at-all-incendiary title, “Arizona's 'universal' education savings account program is a handout for the wealthy,” researchers The number data was thoroughly investigated and identified. That means they come from wealthier and better-educated parts of the state. Now, let's set aside the fact that there is no individual data on students. There is also heterogeneity within zip codes, so just because a child lives in a higher zip code average Income and college attendance rates do not mean they are high-income or that their parents are college-educated. And let's put aside the fact that we've lumped together students who are in the new universal program with students who are in it because of (often very severe) special needs. . And let's put aside the fact that all of these families pay taxes to fund their education. Therefore, giving them a choice is often the same as giving them a portion of their taxes back, and is not “alms.”

There is a more helpful way to think about this problem.

Everett M. Rogers' classic Diffusion of innovation, he describes a bell curve distribution of recruitment. In the left tail, a small number of people are “innovators”. They are people who are always looking for the latest and greatest and are willing to take chances and address issues related to early-stage products and services. As the curve rises, the next group are the “early adopters”. Although they are less adventurous than innovators, they are still on the cutting edge of what is new and different. As we get into the core of the curve, we begin to see an “early majority” and a “late majority” that make up about two-thirds of the population. They are more cautious with the early majority and more skeptical with the early majority. I am slow to make decisions about new things. Finally, at the right end of the curve are the “laggards.” That is, people who do not accept new innovations or do so long after others have.

Rogers' point is that it takes time for new things to penetrate the population. They are not all adopted at once. And, as you might expect, upon surveying the research literature on the subject, Rogers found that early adopters are better educated, have higher social status, and are wealthier than later adopters. I discovered that it is possible.

Think of the first people to own computers and cell phones. They started with tech geeks and wealthy people and eventually spread to other people. If we looked at personal computers in their early days, we might conclude that they were used only by the wealthy and educated. We remember his IBM president, Thomas Watson, who said in 1943 that “there is probably a world market for five computers,” and the founding of Digital Equipment Corporation, who said in 1977: It probably sounded like Ken Olsen. However, there is no reason why anyone would want to have a computer at home. ” Both assumed that hiring would stop before the bell curve started widening. Both were wrong.

That seems to be a mistake that some choice skeptics are making (such as those who accept Brookings' findings and declare the program a failure). They assume only the first hires will be hired..

But knowing what we know about how innovations diffuse, what can proponents of choice do to move the ESA along the adoption curve? Rogers is helpful here as well. Here are his three key topics.

reduce complexity. As Rogers writes, “The complexity of an innovation as perceived by members of a social system is negatively related to its rate of adoption.” The more complex an ESA program is to use, the more people will be able to use it. It will be difficult to get it done. There have been teething pains over family participation in the ESA program and the ease of use of the online platforms some states use to manage family accounts and vendor payments. While innovators and early adopters may have the time and inclination to deal with these, other more cautious and skeptical families do not. User experience issues need to be resolved immediately.

make success visible. Again, Rogers states that “the observability of an innovation as perceived by members of a social system is positively correlated with its rate of adoption.” Families need to know what options are available to them and see concrete examples of families like theirs participating in programs and finding success. Schooling is innovative and can be difficult to observe because participants have limited ability to sit in classrooms and see how schools operate. But both education providers and research and advocacy groups are working hard to show families what's happening in schools, what options are available, and to connect prospective and current parents to find out what's going on. More can be done to see if it is effective.

Consider risk and reward. Late adopters of innovation tend to be more risk averse. they are skeptical. they are intentional. Also, they aren't necessarily wrong. Low-income families don't have the same cushion as higher-income families to take advantage of opportunities in new educational environments. They are as concerned about downside risks as they are about upside potential. Pro-choice advocates need to take these concerns seriously. They need to think about how to reduce the risk of selection, and perhaps encourage new choosers to slot into more established private schools before seriously customizing their child's education .

It is clear that opponents of choice are seizing every opportunity to declare these plans a failure. But there's still a lot of baseball left to play. By relying on what we know about how innovations are adopted, we can silence the cries from the cheap seats and help more families take advantage of the opportunities the ESA program offers. You can move forward with the hiring process.